In this paper, we define and analyze a new blockcipher mode of operation for encryption, CENC, which stands for Cipher-based ENCryption. CENC has the following advantages: (1) beyond the birthday bound security, (2) security proofs with the standard PRP assumption, (3) highly efficient, (4) single blockcipher key, (5) fully parallelizable, (6) allows precomputation of keystream, and (7) allows random access. CENC is based on the new construction of "from PRPs to PRF conversion," which is of independent interest. Based on CENC and a universal hash-based MAC (Wegman-Carter MAC), we also define a new authenticated-encryption with associated-data scheme, CHM, which stands for CENC with Hash-based MAC. The security of CHM is also beyond the birthday bound. * An extended abstract of this paper appears in Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2006 [11]. This is the full version. 
Introduction
A blockcipher mode of operation, or a mode for short, is an algorithm that provides security goals, such as privacy and/or authenticity, based on blockciphers. The mode for privacy is called an encryption mode.
Of many encryption modes, counter (CTR) mode has a number of desirable advantages, and it works as follows. Let E be a blockcipher whose block length is n bits, and let ctr be an n-bit counter. For a plaintext M = (M 0 , . . . , M l−1 ) broken into n-bit blocks, let C i ← M i ⊕ S i , where S i ← E K (ctr + i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, ctr ← ctr + l.
The ciphertext is C = (C 0 , . . . , C l−1 ), and S = (S 0 , . . . , S l−1 ) is the keystream. Starting from [3] , provable security (or reduction-based security) is the standard security goal for modes. For encryption modes, we consider the strong security notion of privacy called "indistinguishability from random strings" from [23] , which provably implies the more standard notions given in [1] . In this strong notion, the adversary is in the adaptive chosen plaintext attack scenario, and the goal is to distinguish the ciphertext from the random string of the same length (where ctr is not considered part of the ciphertext).
For CTR mode, Bellare, Desai, Jokipii and Rogaway were the first who presented the proof of security [1] . The nonce-based treatment of CTR mode was presented by Rogaway [21] . It was proved that, for any adversary against CTR mode, the success probability is at most 0.5σ(σ − 1)/2 n under the assumption that the blockcipher is a secure pseudorandom permutation (PRP), where σ denotes the total ciphertext length in blocks that the adversary obtains. This is the well-known birthday bound.
The above analysis is tight. There is an adversary that meets the security bound within a constant factor. The adversary simply searches for a collision in the keystream of σ blocks, and guesses the data is the true ciphertext iff there is no collision. It is easy to show that the success probability is at least 0.3σ(σ − 1)/2 n . This implies that, as long as E K (·) is a permutation, there is no hope that CTR mode achieves beyond the birthday bound security.
In this paper, we design a new blockcipher mode of operation for encryption. The goals are: (1) beyond the birthday bound security, (2) security proofs with the standard PRP assumption, (3) highly efficient, (4) single blockcipher key, (5) fully parallelizable, (6) allows precomputation of keystream, and (7) allows random access. The original CTR mode achieves all the above goals except for the first one, while we improve the security of CTR mode without breaking its important advantages. As for the security assumption, we do not use the ideal blockcipher model. For efficiency, the number of blockcipher calls is close to CTR mode, and we avoid using any heavy operations, e.g., re-keying. Now in CTR mode, it is known that if E K (·) is a secure pseudorandom function (PRF), then for any adversary the success probability 0, well beyond the birthday bound. Thus the natural approach to achieve beyond the birthday bound security is to construct a secure PRF from PRPs and use the PRF in CTR mode, where the security of PRF must be beyond the birthday bound. There are several such constructions [4, 10, 16, 2] . The first construction, due to Bellare, Krovetz, and Rogaway is called data-dependent re-keying [4] . It was proved that the construction achieves beyond the birthday bound security in the ideal blockcipher model. The truncation construction was analyzed by Hall 
Preliminaries
Notation. If x is a string then |x| denotes its length in bits. If x and y are two equallength strings, then x ⊕ y denotes the xor of x and y. If x and y are strings, then x y denotes their concatenation. Let x ← y denote the assignment of y to x. If X is a set, let x R ← X denote the process of uniformly selecting at random an element from X and assigning it to x. For a positive integer n, {0, 1} n is the set of all strings of n bits. For positive integers n and w, ({0, 1} n ) w is the set of all strings of nw bits, and {0, 1} * is the set of all strings (including the empty string). For positive integers n and m such that n ≤ 2 m − 1, [n] m is the m-bit binary representation of n. For a bit string x and a positive integer n such that |x| ≥ n, first(n, x) and last(n, x) denote the first n bits of x and the last n bits of x, respectively. For a positive integer n, 0 n and 1 n denote the n-times repetition of 0 and 1, respectively.
Blockciphers and function families. The blockcipher (permutation family) is a function E : K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , where, for any K ∈ K, E(K, ·) = E K (·) is a permutation on {0, 1} n . The positive integer n is the block length and an n-bit string is called a block. If K = {0, 1} k , then k is the key length.
The PRP notion for blockciphers was introduced in [18] and later made concrete in [3] . Let Perm(n) denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1} n . This set can be regarded as a blockcipher by considering that each permutation is specified by a unique string. P is a random permutation if P R ← Perm(n). An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm (a program) with access to one or more oracles. Let A be an adversary with access to an oracle, either the encryption oracle E K (·) or a random permutation oracle P (·), and returns a bit. We say A is a PRP-adversary for E, and we define
Similarly, the function family is a function F : K × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n , where, for any
is a function from {0, 1} m to {0, 1} n . Let Func(m, n) denote the set of all functions from {0, 1} m to {0, 1} n . This set can be regarded as a function family by considering that each function in Func(m, n) is specified by a unique string. R is a random function if R R ← Func(m, n). Let A be an adversary with access to an oracle, either F K (·) or a random function oracle R(·), and returns a bit. We say A is a PRF-adversary for F , and we define
For an adversary A, A's running time is denoted by time(A). The running time is its actual running time (relative to some fixed RAM model of computation) and its description size (relative to some standard encoding of algorithms). The details of the big-O notation for the running time reference depend on the RAM model and the choice of encoding.
The frame, nonce, and counter. The modes described in this paper take a positive integer w as a parameter, and it is called a frame width. For fixed positive integer w (say, w = 2 8 ), a w-block string is called a frame. Throughout this paper, we assume w ≥ 1. A nonce N is a bit string, where for each pair of key and plaintext, it is used only once.
Figure 1: Example illustration of F . In this example, w = 3, ω = 1 + ⌊log 2 w⌋ = 2, and
The length of the nonce is denoted by ℓ nonce , and it is at most the block length. We also use an n-bit string called a counter, ctr. This value is initialized based on the value of the nonce, then it is incremented after each blockcipher invocations. The function for increment is denoted by inc(·). It takes an n-bit string x (possibly a counter) and returns the incremented x. We assume inc(x) = x + 1 mod 2 n , but other implementations also work, e.g., with LFSRs if x = 0 n . For i > 0, inc i (ctr) means ctr is incremented for i times. Since the value is initialized based on the value of the nonce, there is no need to maintain this value across the massages.
The Basic Tool: A New Pseudorandom Function F
In this section, we define a new function family F . It takes two parameters, a blockcipher, and a frame width.
Fix the blockcipher E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , and the frame width w. Define ω = 1 + ⌊log 2 w⌋, i.e., we need ω bits to represent w. Now we define the function family F : {0,
. We call L a mask. See Figure 1 for an example.
We have the following information theoretic result on F .
Theorem 1 Let Perm(n) and w be the parameters for F . Let A be a PRF-adversary for F making at most q oracle queries. Then
Notice that w is a constant and the security bound of Theorem 1 is "beyond the birthday bound." Also, if we set σ = qw (i.e., the total number of blocks that the adversary obtains) and measure the security bound in terms of σ, we have Adv
The following definition is useful in proving Theorem 1.
Definition 1 Let x = (x 0 , . . . , x q−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} n−ω ) q be an arbitrary (n − ω)q-bit string. We say that "x is distinct," if
Note that 0 n is included in the definition for "Y is non-zero-distinct." Suppose that
). Then we always have y i [j] = 0 n , and we also see that
Intuitively, Definition 1 is the set of possible input-output pairs, and for these pairs the following lemma, which will be used in the proof of Theorem 1, shows that the distribution is close to uniform. This is the crucial observation for the security improvement. There are no collisions in "one frame," but the collision occurs across the frames.
Lemma 1 Let x = (x 0 , . . . , x q−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} n−ω ) q and Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Y q−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} nw ) q be arbitrarily fixed bit strings, where x is distinct and Y is non-zero-distinct. Then
where
The proof is based on the counting argument.
Proof (of Lemma 1). We first count the number of P ∈ Perm(n) which satisfies 
We have fixed q(w + 1) inputoutput pairs of P , and the remaining 2 n − q(w + 1) entries can be any value. Therefore, the number of P ∈ Perm(n) which satisfies
Then, the left hand side of (1) is at least
We have used the fact that (1 − α) −1 ≥ 1 + α for |α| < 1, and the right hand side of (1) is given by simplifying (2) . 2
We present the proof of Theorem 1 using Lemma 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). Without loss of generality, we assume that A makes exactly q oracle queries and A does not repeat an oracle query. Also, since A is computationally unbounded, we assume that A is deterministic. Now we can regard A as a function f A : ({0, 1} nw ) q → {0, 1}. To see this, let Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Y q−1 ) be an arbitrary nqw-bit string, where each Y i is nw bits. The first query, x 0 , is determined by A. If we return Y i−1 as the answer for x i−1 , the next query x i is determined, and finally, if we return Y q−1 as the answer for x q−1 , the output of A, either 0 or 1, is determined. Therefore, the output of A and theueries, x 0 , . . . , x q−1 , are all determined by fixing Y . Note that for any Y , the corresponding sequence of queries x = (x 0 , . . . ,
, and therefore, we have
Let
. Then we have
On the other hand, let
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1. Then P F is at least
from (3) and (4). Now, we have P F ≥ P R − q 3 (w + 1) 4 /2 2n+1 − qw(w + 1)/2 n+1 , and by applying the same argument to 1 − P F and 1 − P R , we have 1
In F , if the input is x, then the mask is always generated with x [0] ω . In this section, we present a slightly relaxed version of F , called F + , which removes this restriction. Similarly to F , F + takes two parameters, a blockcipher E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , and a frame width w. Now the function family
Observe that F + takes n-bit x as input, and the mask is generated with x. Also, it is not hard to show that F + is a good PRF as long as there is no collision in the input to E.
Let A be an adversary that makes at most q oracle queries and let
, X i is the set of input to E in the i-th query. We say that A is input-respecting if X i ∩ X j = ∅ for any 0 ≤ i < j ≤ q − 1, regardless of oracle responses and regardless of A's internal coins.
We have the following information theoretic result on F + .
Corollary 1 Let Perm(n) and w be the parameters for F + . Let A be a PRF-adversary for F + making at most q oracle queries, where A is input-respecting. Then
The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 1, and omitted. Figure 2 : Definition of the encryption algorithm CENC.Enc (left top), the decryption algorithm CENC.Dec (left bottom), and the keystream generation algorithm CENC.KSGen (right), which is used in both encryption and decryption. Figure 3 : Illustration of the keystream generation algorithm. This example uses w = 3 and outputs l = 7 blocks of keystream S = (S 0 , . . . , S 6 ). This S is used in both encryption and decryption. The mask L is updated after generating w blocks of keystream. The counter ctr is incremented for l + ⌈l/w⌉ = 10 times, and there are 10 blockcipher invocations.
CENC: Cipher-based ENCryption
In this section, we propose a new (nonce-based) encryption scheme, CENC. It takes three parameters, a blockcipher, a nonce length, and a frame width. Fix the blockcipher E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , the nonce length ℓ nonce and the frame width w, where 1 ≤ ℓ nonce < n. CENC consists of two algorithms, the encryption algorithm (CENC.Enc) and the decryption algorithm (CENC.Dec). Both algorithms internally use the keystream generation algorithm (CENC.KSGen). These algorithms are defined in Figure 2 . A picture illustrating CENC.KSGen is given in Figure 3 .
The encryption algorithm CENC.Enc has the following syntax. CENC.Enc : Key × Nonce × Plaintext → Ciphertext, where Key is {0, 1} k , Nonce is {0, 1} ℓnonce , and Plaintext and Ciphertext are {M ∈ {0, 1} * | |M | ≤ n2 ℓmax }, i.e., the set of bit strings at most ℓ max blocks, where ℓ max is the largest integer satisfying ℓ max ≤ w(2 n−ℓnonce − 1)/(w + 1). It takes the key K, the nonce N , and the plaintext M to return the ciphertext C. We
CENC.Enc and CENC.Dec call CENC.SKGen to generate the keystream of required length, where the length is in blocks. The encryption (resp. decryption) is just the xor of the plaintext (resp. ciphertext) and the keystream.
The keystream generation algorithm, CENC.KSGen, takes K, the initial counter value ctr, and a non-negative integer l. The output is a keystream S, where the length of S is l blocks. We write S ← CENC.KSGen K (ctr, l).
In CENC.KSGen, we first generate an n-bit mask, L. ⌈l/w⌉ is the number of frames, incomplete frame counts as one frame. We see that ⌈l/w⌉ masks are generated in line 301. For each mask, w blocks of the keystream are generated in line 304 (except for the last frame, as the last frame may have fewer than w blocks). If l blocks of keystream are generated in line 306, the resulting S is returned in line 308. Observe that the blockcipher is invoked for l + ⌈l/w⌉ times, since we generate ⌈l/w⌉ masks and we have l blocks of keystream, where each block of keystream requires one blockcipher invocation.
Discussion and default parameters. CENC takes the blockcipher E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , the nonce length ℓ nonce (1 ≤ ℓ nonce < n) and the frame width w, as the parameters. With these parameters, CENC can encrypt at most 2 ℓnonce plaintexts, and the maximum length of the plaintext is ℓ max blocks. Note that ℓ max is derived by solving ℓ max +⌈ℓ max /w⌉ ≤ 2 n−ℓnonce in ℓ max , and in general, the bound on ℓ max is ℓ max ≤ 2 n−ℓnonce−1 since ⌈ℓ max /w⌉ ≤ ℓ max . As we will present in Section 6, the security bound of CENC is (w + 1) 4σ3 /w 3 2 2n+1 + (w + 1)σ/2 n+1 , whereσ is (roughly) the total number of blocks processed by one key.
Our default parameters are, E is any blockcipher such that n ≥ 128, ℓ nonce = n/2, and w = 2 8 = 256. For example, if we use the AES, CENC can encrypt at most 2 64 plaintexts, the maximum length of the plaintext is 2 63 blocks (2 37 GBytes), and the security bound iŝ σ 3 /2 248 +σ/2 121 (we used (w + 1) 4 /w 3 < 261 < 2 9 ), thusσ should be sufficiently smaller that 2 82 blocks (2 56 GBytes).
The frame width, w, should be large enough so that we can implement CENC efficiently. On the other hand, it affects the security bound. We chose w = 2 8 = 256, which implies 256 blocks of keystream are generated with 257 blockcipher invocations, thus the cost is about 0.4% compared to CTR mode. We see that the efficiency loss is very small in both software and hardware. Also, the security bound is low enough with this value of w. We do not recommend w > 2 8 (when n = 128) because of the security loss.
64-bit blockciphers. We do not claim that CENC is generally useful for n = 64, since there are restrictions on the nonce length (thus the number of plaintexts), and the plaintext length.
For example, if we use Triple-DES and (ℓ nonce , w) = (32, 256), CENC can encrypt at most 2 32 plaintexts, and the maximum length of the plaintext is 2 31 blocks (16GBytes), which may not be enough for general applications (still, it is comparable to CTR mode). In this case, the security bound isσ 3 /2 120 +σ/2 57 , which impliesσ should be sufficiently smaller that 2 40 blocks (2 13 GBytes).
The limitations of the nonce length and the plaintext length can be removed if we use a counter (instead of a nonce) that is maintained across the plaintexts. This "counter version of CENC" is more suitable for 64-bit blockciphers.
Security of CENC
CENC is a symmetric encryption scheme. Before showing the security results on CENC, we first formally define what we mean by symmetric encryption schemes, and what we mean by such schemes to be secure.
Symmetric encryption schemes. A (nonce-based) symmetric encryption scheme is a pair of algorithms SE = (E, D) where E is a deterministic encryption algorithm E : Key × Nonce × Plaintext → Ciphertext and D is a deterministic decryption algorithm D : Key × Nonce × Ciphertext → Plaintext. The key space Key is a set of keys, and is a nonempty set having a distribution (the uniform distribution when the set is finite). The nonce space Nonce, the plaintext space Plaintext, and the ciphertext space Ciphertext are nonempty sets of strings. We write
Nonce-respecting adversary. Let A be an adversary with access to an encryption oracle E K (·, ·). This oracle, on input (N, M ), returns the ciphertext Privacy of symmetric encryption schemes. We adopt the strong notion of privacy for nonce-based encryption schemes from [23] . This notion, which we call indistinguishability from random strings, provably implies the more standard notions given in [1] .
Let A be an adversary with access to an oracle, either the encryption oracle E K (·, ·) or R(·, ·), and returns a bit. The R(·, ·) oracle, on input (N, M ), returns a random string of length |E K (N, M )|. We say that A is a PRIV-adversary for SE. We assume that any PRIV-adversary is nonce-respecting. The advantage of PRIV-adversary A for SE = (E, D) having key space Key is
Security results on CENC. Let A be a nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary for CENC, and assume that A makes at most q oracle queries, and the total length of these queries is at most σ blocks, where "the total length of queries" is defined as follows: if A makesueries (N 0 , M 0 ), . . . , (N q−1 , M q−1 ), then the total length of queries is σ = ⌈|M 0 |/n⌉ + · · · + ⌈|M q−1 |/n⌉, i.e, the total number of blocks of plaintexts. We have the following information theoretic result.
Theorem 2 Let Perm(n), ℓ nonce , and w be the parameters for CENC. Let A be a noncerespecting PRIV-adversary for CENC making at most q oracle queries, and the total length of these queries is at most σ blocks. Then Given Theorem 2, we have the following complexity theoretic result.
Corollary 2 Let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , ℓ nonce , and w be the parameters for CENC. Let A be a nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary for CENC making at most q oracle queries, and the total length of these queries is at most σ blocks. Then there is a PRPadversary B for E making at most Proof. The proof is standard, and we only check the number of queries made by B. In simulating A's oracle by using B's oracle, suppose that the length of the i-th query made by A is l i blocks. Then B makes at most (w + 1)(⌈l 0 /w⌉ + · · · + ⌈l q−1 /w⌉) queries, which is at most (w + 1)(σ/w + q) = (w + 1)σ/w queries. This holds regardless the value of l 0 , . . . , l q−1 . 2
CHM: CENC with Hash-based MAC
In this section, we present a new (nonce-based) authenticated-encryption with associateddata (AEAD) scheme, CHM. It takes six parameters, a blockcipher, a nonce length, a tag length, a frame width, and two constants. Fix the blockcipher E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , the nonce length ℓ nonce , the tag length τ , the frame width w, and two n-bit constants const 0 and const 1 . We require that 1 ≤ ℓ nonce < n, 1 ≤ τ ≤ n, const 0 = const 1 , and first(1, const 0 ) = first(1, const 1 ) = 1 (the most significant bits of const 0 and const 1 are both 1).
CHM consists of two algorithms, the encryption algorithm (CHM.Enc) and the decryption algorithm (CHM.Dec). These algorithms are defined in Figure 5 . Both algorithms use the keystream generation algorithm (CHM.KSGen) and a hash function (CHM.Hash). CHM.KSGen is equivalent to CENC.KSGen defined in Figure 2 , and the hash function CHM.Hash is defined in Figure 6 .
The syntax of the encryption algorithm is CHM.Enc : Key × Nonce × Header × Plaintext → Ciphertext × Tag, where the key space Key is {0, 1} k , the nonce space Nonce is {0, 1} ℓnonce , and the header space Header is {0, 1} * . The plaintext space Plaintext and ciphertext space Ciphertext are {M ∈ {0, 1} * | |M | ≤ n2 ℓmax }, where ℓ max is the largest integer satisfying ℓ max ≤ w(2 n−ℓnonce−1 − 1)/(w + 1) − 1. The tag space Tag is {0, 1} τ . It takes the key K, the nonce N , the header H, and the plaintext M to return the ciphertext C and the tag T . We write (C, T ) ← CHM.Enc K (N, H, M ). The decryption algorithm CHM.Dec : Key × Nonce × Header × Ciphertext × Tag → Plaintext ∪ {reject} takes K, N , H, C and T to return M or a special symbol reject. We write M ← CHM.Dec K 
CHM is the natural combination of CENC and a universal hash function-based MAC (Wegman-Carter MAC). As a universal hash function, we chose the standard polynomialbased hash, since it is efficient in both software and hardware, and it is well studied. The multiplication is done in the finite field GF(2 n ) using a canonical polynomial to represent field elements. The suggested canonical polynomial is the lexicographically first polynomial among the irreducible polynomials of degree n that have a minimum number of nonzero coefficients. For n = 128 the indicated polynomial is x 128 + x 7 + x 2 + x + 1.
Discussion and default parameters. CHM takes six parameters, the blockcipher E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , the nonce length ℓ nonce , the tag length τ , the frame width w, and two n-bit constants const 0 and const 1 . With these parameters, CHM can encrypt at most 2 ℓnonce plaintext-header pairs, and the maximum length of the plaintext is ℓ max blocks (ℓ max is derived by solving ℓ max + 1 + ⌈(ℓ max + 1)/w⌉ ≤ 2 n−ℓnonce−1 in ℓ max ). As we will present in Section 8, the security bound of CHM is (w + 1) 3σ2 /w 2 2 2n−3 + (w + 1) 4σ3 /w 3 2 2n+1 + 1/2 n + (w + 1)σ/2 n+1 for privacy, and (w + 1) 3σ2 /w 2 2 2n−3 + (w + 1) 4σ3 /w 3 2 2n+1 + 1/2 n + (w + 1)σ/2 n+1 + (1 + H max + M max )/2 τ for authenticity, where Figure 2 , and CHM.Hash is defined in Figure 6 . σ is (roughly) the total number of blocks processed by one key, M max is the maximum block length of plaintexts, and H max is the maximum block length of headers.
Our default parameters are, E is any blockcipher such that n ≥ 128, ℓ nonce = n/2 − 1, τ ≥ 96, w = 2 8 = 256, const 0 = 1 n−1 0 and const 1 = 1 n .
With these parameters, if we use the AES, CHM can encrypt at most 2 63 plaintextsheader pairs, and the maximum length of the plaintext is 2 63 blocks (2 37 GBytes), and the security bounds areσ 3 /2 242 +σ/2 120 for privacy, andσ 3 /2 242 +σ/2 120 + (1 + H max + M max )/2 τ for authenticity. This impliesσ should be sufficiently smaller that 2 80 blocks (2 54 GBytes), and H max and M max should be small enough so that (1 + H max + M max )/2 τ is low enough.
Security of CHM
CHM is an authenticated-encryption with associated-data (AEAD) scheme. Before showing the security results on CHM, we first formally define what we mean by AEAD schemes, and what we mean by such schemes to be secure.
An AEAD scheme. A (nonce-based) authenticated-encryption with associated-data (AEAD) scheme is a pair of algorithms AE = (E, D) where E is a deterministic encryption algorithm E : Key×Nonce×Header×Plaintext → Ciphertext×Tag and D is a deterministic decryption algorithm D : Key × Nonce × Header × Ciphertext × Tag → Plaintext ∪ {reject}. The key space Key is a set of keys. The nonce space Nonce and the header space Header (also called the space of associated data), the plaintext space Plaintext and the ciphertext space Ciphertext are nonempty sets of strings. (We note that there is a more general treatment where Ciphertext and Tag are not separated. See [7] . We separate them for simplicity.) We write
Privacy of AEAD schemes. We follow the security notion from [7] . Let A be an adversary with access to an oracle, either the encryption oracle E K (·, ·, ·) or R(·, ·, ·), and returns a bit. The R(·, ·, ·) oracle, on input (N, H, M ), returns a random string of length |E K (N, H, M )|. We say that A is a PRIV-adversary for AE. We assume that any PRIVadversary is nonce-respecting (i. Authenticity of AEAD schemes. A notion of authenticity of ciphertext for AEAD schemes was formalized in [23, 22] following [14, 6, 5] . This time, let A be an adversary with access to an encryption oracle E K (·, ·, ·) and returns a tuple, (N, H, C, T ). This tuple is called a forgery attempt. We say that A is an AUTH-adversary for AE. We assume that any AUTH-adversary is nonce-respecting. (The condition is understood to apply only to the adversary's encryption oracle. Thus a nonce used in an encryption-oracle query may be used in a forgery attempt.) We say A forges if A returns (N, H, C, T ) such that
That is, adversary A may never return a forgery attempt (N, H, C, T ) such that the encryption oracle previously returned (C, T ) in response to a query (N, H, M ). Then the advantage of AUTH-adversary A for AEAD scheme AE = (E, D) having key space Key is
Privacy results on CHM. Let A be a nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary for CHM, and assume that A makes at most q oracle queries, and the total plaintext length of these queries is at most σ blocks, where "the total plaintext length of queries" is defined as
e., the total number of blocks of plaintexts. We have the following information theoretic result.
Theorem 3 Let Perm(n), ℓ nonce , τ , w, const 0 and const 1 be the parameters for CHM. Let A be a nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary making at most q oracle queries, and the total plaintext length of these queries is at most σ blocks. Then
whereσ = σ + q(w + 1).
Note that there is no restriction on the header length. If we use w + 1 ≤ 2w, we have the simpler form, Adv priv CHM (A) ≤ wσ 2 /2 2n−6 + wσ 3 /2 2n−3 + 1/2 n + wσ/2 n . The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section 9. From Theorem 3, we have the following complexity theoretic result.
Corollary 3 Let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , ℓ nonce , τ , w, const 0 and const 1 be the parameters for CHM. Let A be a nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary making at most q oracle queries, and the total plaintext length of these queries is at most σ blocks. Then there is a PRP-adversary B for E making at most (w + 1)σ/w oracle queries, time(B) = time(A) + O(nσw), and Adv
Proof. Suppose that the plaintext length of the i-th query made by A is l i blocks. Then B makes at most (w + 1)(⌈(l 0 + 1)/w⌉ + · · · + ⌈(l q−1 + 1)/w⌉) queries, which is at most (w+1)(σ/w+q/w+q) = (w+1)σ/w queries. This holds regardless the value of l 0 , . . . , l q−1 . The rest of the proof is standard.
2
Authenticity results on CHM. Let A be an AUTH-adversary for CHM, and assume that A makes at most q oracle queries (including the final forgery attempt), the total plaintext length of these queries is at most σ blocks, the maximum plaintext length of these queries is at most M max blocks, and the maximum header length of these queries is at most H max blocks. Here, if A makes queries (N 0 , H 0 , M 0 ), . . . , (N q−2 , H q−2 , M q−2 ), and returns the forgery attempt (N * , H * , C * , T * ), then σ, M max and H max are defined as
We say A's query resource is (q, σ, M max , H max ). We have the following information theoretic result.
Theorem 4 Let Perm(n), ℓ nonce , τ , w, const 0 and const 1 be the parameters for CHM. Let A be a nonce-respecting AUTH-adversary whose query resource is (q, σ, M max , H max ). Then Adv
If
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Section 9. From Theorem 4, we have the following complexity theoretic result.
Corollary 4 Let E : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , ℓ nonce , τ , w, const 0 , and const 1 be the parameters for CHM. Let A be a nonce-respecting AUTH-adversary whose query resource is (q, σ, M max , H max ). Then there is a PRP-adversary B for E making at most (w + 1)σ/w oracle queries, time(B) = time(A) + O(nσw), and Adv
The proof is almost the same as that of Corollary 3, and omitted.
Security Proofs of CHM
Another security result on the basic tool. To prove Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, consider the function family F + defined in Section 4. We show a different security result on F + .
First, recall the definition of F + from Section 4 (but we will concentrate on the information theoretic result). Let P R ← Perm(n) be a random permutation, and fix the frame width w. Let ω = 1 + ⌊log 2 w⌋. Then
Now let A be an adversary. This A is the PRF-adversary for F + , but we give A additional information, i.e., we allow A to access the blockcipher itself. That is, A is given either a pair of oracles (P (·), F + P (·)), or a pair of random function oracles (R 0 (·), R 1 (·)), where R 0 ∈ Func(n, n) and R 1 ∈ Func(n, nw), with the following rules.
• If W i ∈ {0, 1} n is the i-th query for the first oracle (either P (·) or R 0 (·)), then first(1, W i ) = 1 must hold.
• If x j ∈ {0, 1} n is the j-th query for the second oracle (either F + P (·) or R 1 (·)), then first(1, x j ) = 0 must hold. That is, input/output samples from the first oracle are not used in F + P (·) oracle.
• A does not repeat the same query to its first oracle.
• A is input-respecting with respect to the second oracle (see Section 4).
We say A is msb-input-respecting if the above rules hold regardless of oracle responses and regardless of A's internal coins. Define Adv prf Perm(n),F + (A) as
and we say A is a PRF-adversary for (Perm(n), F + ).
We have the following information theoretic result.
Theorem 5 Let Perm(n) and w be the parameters for F + . Let A be an msb-inputrespecting PRF-adversary for (Perm(n), F + ) making at most r oracle queries to its first oracle and at most q oracle queries to its second oracle. Then
The proof of Theorem 5 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, but it is not derived directly (and Theorem 1 is not a corollary of Theorem 5 because of the most significant bit restriction). To prove Theorem 5, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let x = (x 0 , . . . , x q−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} n ) q and Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Y q−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} nw ) q be arbitrarily fixed bit strings, where x is distinct and Y is non-zero-distinct (see Definition 1). Also, let W = (W 0 , . . . , W r−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} n ) r and Z = (Z 0 , . . . , Z r−1 ) ∈ ({0, 1} n ) r be arbitrarily fixed bit strings, where W i = W j and Z i = Z j for any 0 ≤ i < j ≤ r − 1 (i.e., W and Z are distinct). Assume {x 0 , . . . , x q−1 } ∩ {W 0 , . . . , W r−1 } = ∅. Then
Proof. We first count the number of P ∈ Perm(n) which satisfies P (W j ) = Z j for 0 ≤ j ≤ r −1 and
is at least 0≤i≤q−1 (2 n − r(w + 1) − i(w + 1) 2 ), since there are 2 n − r(w + 1) possibilities for L 0 , and once L 0 , . . . , L i−1 are fixed, we have at least 2 n − r(w + 1)
We have fixed r + q(w + 1) input-output pairs of P , and the remaining 2 n −r−q(w+1) entries can be any value. Therefore, the number of P ∈ Perm(n) which satisfies P (W j ) = Z j for 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1 and
Then, the left hand side of (8) is at least
and the right hand side of (8) is given by simplifying (9) . 2 We now present the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof (of Theorem 5). Without loss of generality, we assume that A makes exactly r oracle queries to its first oracle, and exactly q oracle queries to its second oracle, and A does not repeat an oracle query to the same oracle. Also, since A is computationally unbounded, we assume that A is deterministic. Let W i denote the query for the first oracle, and x j denote the query for the second oracle. Now we can regard A as a function f A : ({0, 1} n ) r × ({0, 1} nw ) q → {0, 1}. To see this, let Z = (Z 0 , . . . , Z r−1 ) be an nr-bit string, and let Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Y q−1 ) be an nqw-bit string, where each Z i is n bits and Y i is nw bits.
Observe that if we return Z i as the answer W i for 0 ≤ i ≤ r−1 and return Y j as the answer x j for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, the output of A, either 0 or 1, is determined. Therefore, the output of A is determined by fixing Z and Y . Also, note that for any (Z, Y ), the corresponding sequence of queries satisfies the conditions in Lemma 2, since A is msb-input-respecting (first(1,
from Lemma 2 and the fact that p R = 1/(2 n ) r+qw . By using (10) and (11),
Finally, we have upper bound on P F + by applying the same argument to 1 − P F + and 1 − P R . This concludes the proof of Theorem 5. 2
We now present the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof (of Theorem 3). Suppose for a contradiction that Adv priv CHM (A) is larger than the right hand side of (6) . Let the oracles (O 0 , O 1 ) be either (P (·),
Consider the PRF-adversary B for (Perm(n), F + ) in Figure 7 , where B uses A as a subroutine.
First, it is easy to see that B is msb-input-respecting. Next, we see that if (O 0 , O 1 ) is (P (·), F + P (·)), then B gives A a perfect simulation of CHM.Enc P , and therefore we have Observe that B makes r = 2 queries to its first oracle, and for the second oracle, assume the queries made by A are (N 0 , H 0 , M 0 ), . . . , (N q−1 , H q−1 , M q−1 ). If we let l i = ⌈|M i |/n⌉, then B makes ⌈(l 0 + 1)/w⌉ + · · · + ⌈(l q−1 + 1)/w⌉ queries, which is at most (l 0 + · · · + l q−1 )/w + q/w + q ≤ (q + σ)/w + q =σ/w queries. Note that this holds regardless the value of l 0 , . . . , l q−1 .
From the assumption for a contradiction, Adv priv CHM (A) is larger than the right hand side of (6), which implies Adv prf Perm(n),F + (B) > (w+1) 3σ2 /w 2 2 2n−3 +(w+1) 4σ3 /w 3 2 2n+1 + 1/2 n + (w + 1)σ/2 n+1 . This contradicts Theorem 5.
Before proving Theorem 4, we recall the following well known fact on the property of CHM.Hash [24] . Proposition 1 Let x, x ′ ∈ {0, 1} * be two distinct bit strings, and let l = ⌈|x|/n⌉ and l ′ = ⌈|x ′ |/n⌉ be their block length. Then for any τ ≤ n and any τ -bit string const τ ∈ {0, 1} τ , we have Pr(S R ← {0, 1} n : first(τ, CHM.Hash S (x) ⊕ CHM.Hash S (x ′ )) = const τ ) ≤ max{l, l ′ }/2 τ .
We now present the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof (of Theorem 4). First, consider the simulation CHM.Sim1 in Figure 8 of CHM, where S 0 and S 1 are generated by the random function R 0 ∈ Func(n, n), and the keystream generation, CHM.KSGen uses the random function R 1 ∈ Func(n, nw).
Let Adv auth CHM.Sim1 (A) be the success probability of A's forgery, where the oracle is CHM.Sim1, i.e., 
To see this, suppose for a contradiction that (12) is larger than (13) . Then, by using A as a subroutine, it is possible to construct an msb-input-respecting PRF-adversary B for (Perm(n), F + ) making at most 2 oracle queries to its first oracle and at mostσ/w oracle queries to its second oracle, where B simply simulates R 0 and R 1 in Figure 8 by using its own oracles, and returns 1 if and only if A succeeds in forgery. This implies Pr(P Now we modify CENC.Sim1 to CENC.Sim2 in Figure 9 .
1. Instead of using a random function R 0 , we choose two n-bit random strings (lines 100 and 101). This makes no difference in the advantage of A.
2. Similarly, instead of using a random function R 1 , we choose an nw-bit random string each time R 1 is called. This implies Y in line 405 of Figure 8 is an nl-bit random
• Case N * = N i and H * = H i : This case is similar to the above. We first fix any S 0 . Then Adv auth CHM.Sim3 (A) is at most Pr(S 1 R ← {0, 1} n : first(τ, CHM.Hash S 1 (H * ) ⊕ CHM.Hash S 1 (H i )) = const τ ). In this case, const τ = first(τ, CHM.Hash S 0 (C * ) ⊕ CHM.Hash S 0 (C i )) ⊕ T * ⊕ T i . This probability is at most max{|H * |, |H i |}/2 τ from Proposition 1. 
Finally, from (12) , (13), (14), (15) , and (16), we have (7). 2
Discussions
Counter-based versions. CENC and CHM use a nonce, and it is natural to consider their counter-based versions. Call them CENC-C and CHM-C, respectively. They use an n-bit counter maintained across the plaintexts (usually by the sender). The drawback is the difficulty of implementation and it is relatively harder to use them properly, which is the reason why we have concentrated on the nonce-based schemes. The advantage of CENC-C and CHM-C is that, the nonce length and the maximum plaintext length restrictions are removed, while the security is unchanged (further, non-adaptive version of PRP is enough for the security proofs). The restrictions only come from the security bound (instead of the schemes). Thus, if carefully implemented and properly used, these counter versions are suitable especially for 64-bit blockciphers
Tightness of the security bounds. For CTR mode, the security bound is tight up to a constant factor. However, for CENC and CHM (and the PRF F in Section 3), we do not know the tightness of our security bounds. The tightness is an open question. For example, if we take CENC, the bound is O(wσ 3 /2 2n + wσ/2 n ). The question is the existence of an adversary A that breaks the privacy of CENC with aboutσ = 2 82 data (without breaking the pseudorandomness of the AES), or the proof that the security is better than the above. We conjecture that the bound of CENC can be improved to O(wσ/2 n ), possibly by using the technique from [2] 1 .
